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RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS

PAUL VALLIERE

This essay describes the sitUation and orienration of the Russian Orthodox
Church with respect co human tights. Along the broad spectrnm of rights I
focus mainly on the civil righrs of individuals and nonstate associarions rarher
than the subsistence rights and rightS to social services mat figure so promi
nently in socialisr meories of rights. By this I do not mean co suggest mat me
rights wim which socialists are concerned are ofsecondary importance. It is sim
ply a question of accepting me demands of my subject. Ever since me disestab
lishment and disenfranchisemenr of me Russian Onhodox Church as a result
of me Russian Revolution the rights wim which the church has been concerned
are the rights of individual believers and of the church as an institution. These
concerns were stimulated nor by theology or ideology bur by the harsh facts of
life in the Soviet petiod: widespread persecution of religious believers and the
vittual absence of civil rights respecting teligion. TIle extem to which prerevo
lurionary Russian Onhodoxy may have helped to prepare the ground on which
Soviet socialism was built is an issue that exceeds the scope of mis essay.
Whether the Russian Orthodox Church is concerned abour human tights
at all has been a matter of debate. The view that me church is little more than
a tOol in the hands of whatevet state governs Russia at a given rime is wide
spread in the West and may not be much affected by the qualification that
"Russian Orthodox Church," in this essay, means not JUSt the hietatchs who
represem the church on the national or inrernationallevel but the whole com-
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pany of Otthodox believers who accept the church of the Patriarch of Moscow
as their own. But even sympathetic observers of the Russian Orthodox
Chutch would agree that the church has been more passive in social and polit
ical terms, and more subservient to the state than many churches in the West
in modern times. In recent yeats the COntrast has been highlighted by the
example of the Roman Catholic Church of Poland, which managed to estab
lish itself as a kind ofsurrogate civil society in a Communist state well inside
the zone of Soviet hegemony.
To explain the relative passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church some
observers have pointed ro special characteristics of Eastern Orthodoxy, oth
ers ro the legacy of the tsarist state church, still others to the btutalization of
the church by the Soviet state in the 1920S and 1930S. Each of these faCtors is
important, although the last deserves attention first because it is the most
obvious cause of the social and political weakness of the church in presenr
day Russia.
In 1914 the Russian Orthodox Church was the largest Christian church in
the world after the Roman Catholic Church and the largest of all national
churches. It supporred 68 dioceses, over 50,000 priests, more than 60,000
deacons and psalmiSts, almost 100,000 monks and nuns in more than 1,000
monasteties, 57 theological seminaries, and 4 graduate schools of theology. I
The vast majority of the Russian empire's 100,000,000 Great Russians,
Uktainians, and Belarusians as well as significant numbers of minority peo
ples wete baptized members of the Orthodox Church.
This huge church was also an institution struggling to renew itself. A
reform movement had begun in the early yeats of the twentieth century and
acquired new strengrh after the February Revolution of 1917. The restoration
of the Patriarchate of Moscow in November 1917 afrer a lapse of more than
two centuties was the signal accomplishmenr of the movement. However, the
disestablishment of rhe church by decree of rhe Sovier government in January
1918, rhe dislocations of rhe civil war and the violent repression of rhe hierar
chyand clergy in rhe early 1920S left the church in a stare of disttess by the
time Parriarch Tikhon died in 1925. The refusal of the Sovier governmenr to
allow the church to hold a national council to elect a successor to the
deceased patriarch furrher weakened the instirution. The declaration of loy
alty to the Soviet state in 1927 by the locum tenens of the patriarchal office,
Metropolitan Sergii, brought the church no secular benefits and precipitated
a schism in the Orthodox community. What remained of the institution was
consumed in the genetal holocaUSt of the 1930S. By 1939 the Russian
Orthodox Church was one of the weakest churches in Christendom. It had
no head, no diocesan administtation, few ptiests or bishops at liberty, and
very few functioning parishes.
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The revival of the Russian Orthodox Church began during World War II.
It was a spontaneous phenomenon at the local level as well as the result of
the warrime government policy of fostering traditional Russian patriotism.
Metropolitan Sergii was elected pattiarch by a small meeting of bishops in
1943, and after Sergii's death in 1945 Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad was
chosen to teplace him. Diocesan adminisrration was rescoted, and a few the
ological schools and monasteries were reconstimted. The rescored church
was not comparable in size, much less in power, to the prerevolutionary
church. 2 Nevertheless, the posrwar simation represented a dramatic change
fot the better.
Unforrunately the church's gains proved vulnerable co the caprices of
Communist policymakers. In the early 1960s the Khrushchev government
launched a new antireligious campaign that led ro the closing of about half the
patishes reopened during the war. After Khrushchev's fall in 1964 the govern
ment disconrinued the campaign but did not resrore what had been wrested
from the church. In this sense the campaign was a vicrory for the state.
Howevet, it produced an unintended and unprecedented side effect; the
Orrhodox rights movement.
The Orthodox rights movement is a natural focal point for the discussion
of Russian Otthodoxy and human rights. However, co appreciate the sigifi
cance of the movement one must consider the ecclesiastical and civil contexts
in which it arose. The ecclesiastical context was shaped by Eastern Orthodox
tradition. The civil context was shaped by Soviet law.

ORTHODOX TRADITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Historically Eastern Orthodox tradition has been less disposed to defending
human rights than Roman Catholic or classical Protestant traditions. ihe
Roman Catholic Church, while often antagonistic ro individual liberty, has
always defended its rights as an international ecclesiastical polity standing
above secular polities and having cerrain claims on them. The church's claims
serve co limit the power of the state ovet persons in Roman Catholic coun
tries. Protestantism. while lacking the international structure and legalist
genius of the Roman Catholic Church, provides a hospitable ground for the
cultivation of rightS by according individual conscience a central tole in the
religious value system. The configuration of values in Eastern Orthodoxy
shares something with both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, but not
those aspects that most prompt an intetest in rights. Like Roman Cathol
icism, Eastern Orchodoxy propounds a highly corporate and sacramental view
of salvation and so does not encourage individualism on religious grounds.
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Like Protestantism, however, Eastern Orthodoxy never tires of preaching that
Christiani ty is a religion of grace, not law, for which reason it rejects the
coumer-secular legalism of Roman Catholicism. 3 The result is a theological
conceptuality less promising fOt the CUltivation of rights rhan one finds in the
Westetn Christian tradirions.
Yet it would be wrong to deny the possibility of a rights orien tation arising
in Eastetn Orthodoxy. Like all great faith tradirions, Orthodoxy comprises
concepts of human dignity which can at least sUppOrt, if they do not neces
sarily generate, the idea of human rights. Furthermore, under the pressure of
historic challenges people often find new meaning in traditional ideals. Thus,
while some of the most important ideals of Orthodoxy tend to discourage
individuals from viewing themselves as rights-bearers over against the com
munity, and discourage the community from viewing itself as distinct from
the state, these ideals did not prevent a lively Orthodox rights movemem from
developing in the very untraditional circumstances of the Soviet Union.
The Orthodox view of the telation of the individual to the community has
been profoundly shaped by the ideal ofwholeness. In the Orthodox vision sal
vadon in Christ comes about through incorporation intO his sactamental
community, the church or "body ofChrisr." The church achieves public def
inition through its liturgy, dogmas, and canons; but its essential quality is rhe
mystical wholeness which these forms are meant ro embody. For Orrhodoxy
"the church" means the whole company of saints seeking to embrace the
whole of humankind and reconcile it with the whole cosmos. 4 The Russian
word for this wholeness is sobornost'. It comes from a root meaning "gather."
"Conciliarity" and "catholici ty" are specialized ecclesiastical translations of
the term. Sobol' also means "cathedral," which suggests perhaps the best pic
ture of sobornost'. One imagines a crowd of worshipers of all ages and srations
of life gathered for liturgy under the dome of a cathedral. As the liturgy
unfolds, the choral music, the colorful icons of saints and angels. the smell of
incense and wax and the hieratic vestments, postures, and processions of the
clergy conspire to induce a powerful sense of incorporation into a great, pul
sating whole. Indeed, the Orthodox liturgy offers more than a picture of
sobornost'; it actualizes it.
Orthodox thinkers are careful to distinguish sobornost' from collectivism or
egalitarianism. They see [he church as a community of persons, each with a
unique contribution to make to the whole. Lichnost', "personhood," stands
close to sobornost' in [he Orthodox hierarchy of values. It is reflected, for
example, in the group portraits of traditional iconography in which the artist
typically accotds to each individual some distinguishing feature of dress, coif
fure, expression, posture, or function. 5 The structure of the liturgy, roo, offers
the laity ample opportunity to direct their attention to individual needs, con
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cems, and sources of inspirarion. Srill, in classical Orthodoxy rhe individual is
nor regarded as the telos of the communiry. The idea of lichnost' suggesrs per
sonalism bur nor individualism. To rhe Orrhodox mind rhe whole appears
grearer, more esrimable, more secure than rhe parts. G The rendency of
Orthodox thinkers is to synrhesize, nor analyze; w integrate, not isolate. This
is especially true of modern Orthodox thinkers, who have had w defend the
Orthodox er1lOs againsr material and spiritual threats from the Wesr. 7 Most
Russian Orthodox thinkers in modern rimes, such as Khomiakov, l(jreevsky,
Dosroevsky, Leonriev, Fyodorov, and Solzhenirsyn, have held a community
based on sobornost' and lichnost', wholeness and personhood, ro be ethicaHy
superior to a community based on rhe social contract and individual righrs.
Hand in hand wirh this view went a "tradirion of rhe censure oflaw" in Russia,
an ami-legal prej udice which inevitably impeded the development of modern
conceprions of human righrs. 8
If the ideal of wholeness discouraged individuals from viewing themselves
aparr from rhe community, ir also made the Orthodox Church slow to dis
ringuish itself from the state. The polirical dependency of the churches in the
Orthodox Easr conrrasts sharply with the partern of chutch-State relarions
rhat developed in the West. Since rhe Reform Papacy of the eleventh century
the Roman Catholic Church has defined itself juridically as a countersrate or
supers rate distincr from secular sovereignties. While Rome was by no means
always successful in enforcing irs claims, the ideal wok root. Also, r11e need to
arbirtare between ecclesiasrical and secular sovereignties was one of the chief
morivarions for rhe development of law in the West, including rhe language
and methodology of rights. Among rhe theological disciplines canon law
played a particuJarly dynamic role. In the Orthodox Easr, by contrast, the par
tern of church-Stare relarions wok shape much earlier, in the fourth and fifth
centuries, and embodied rhe ideal of harmony (sympho7lia) rather than dual
ism. Church and srate were seen not as competing jurisdictions but as twO
aspecrs, sacramental and lay, of an organic whole. The ideal left litrle room for
concepts of conflict or propheric rension between church and srare. Canon
law was a conservative discipline.
To be sure, there were conflicts between church and stare in rhe Chtistian
East, including fierce confrontations such as the Iconoclastic controversy in
eighth-century Byzanrium and the Schism (Rasko/) in seventeenth-centuty
Muscovy. But these episodes did nor inspire creative new concepts of church
stare relations. The chief effect of the Russian Schism, for example, was ro
weaken the established church and cause it w accept an even more subservient
role in the Russian state system on the eve of modern rimes.
The ascerical ideal also presents an obstacle ro a righrs orientarion in
Orthodoxy. The mosr esreemed form of religious virruosity in Orthodoxy is
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not that of the prophetic emissary, militant reformer, crusader, or preacher,
but that of the monk. The monk is a kind of religious individualist, but his
individualism is inspired by the call ro leave the world, not transform it. This
ideal played a fateful role in the structuring of the Orthodox clergy. In
Orthodoxy the parish clergy are mostly married men, bur bishops must be
monks. While mis arrangement has its advantages (e.g., clerical celibacy has
nor been the divisive issue in Orthodoxy rhat it has been in Roman
Catholicism), ir has unquestionably limited the capacity of rhe clergy to
mobilize in defense of the secular rights of the church. Parish priests have been
too enmeshed in the economic and familial nerworks of "this" world ro chal
lenge it in the name of the next.
The hierarchy, on the orher hand, while bearing the chief responsibility for
the government of the church in "this" world, has all roo often failed ro value
this responsibility in positive rerms. Practicing ascetical renunciation at the
expense of the church, so ro speak, Orthodox hierarchs have often accepted
oppression by secular authorities as a test of parience rather than of power.
Commenting on rhis informal "cooperation of tradition and oppression,"
Vladimir Zelinsky righcly observes that "in Orthodoxy it is not weakness of
the will as such but precisely a zealous piety thar demands a spirit of bound
less submissiveness."9
Along with a weak parish clergy went a weak parish srructure. In tsarist
Russia rhe Orthodox parish was a sleepy, unpropheric place because it was roo
much a part of irs environment. Religious and social community were basi
cally identical. The local priest usually inherited his position from his or his
wife's father. The concept of the parish as a unit of social, political, or mis
sionary mobilization rarely arose, and rhe concept of the church as a volun
tary association did not arise at all. These ideas were absent during the Soviet
period, roo, although for the opposite reason; religious and social community
were too sharply divorced. Because gatherings of believers outside liturgy were
prohibited, people who prayed together had little opportunity ro work or even
talk together. Also, since open churches were few, tar apart, and crowded, wor
shipers usually did not get to know each other or their clergy very well. The
Orthodox parish became an impersonal and diffuse community despite the
fervent piety which no observer could fail ro note. 10
The ideal of national religious establishment also contributed to the pas
sivity of the Orthodox Church toward the state. In tsarist Russia religious
establishment dulled rhe church's awareness of the extent to which it was a
captive of the srare system. The Russian Revolution swepr away the establish
ment bur nor the cultural and ecclesiastical mentality underlying it. 10 this
day most Russian Orthodox clergy and laity cherish the ideal of a national
church. Russian Orthodox people do not think of rheir church as one denom
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ination Q[ sect among othets but as the Chmch of Russia. a chmch whose des
tiny is tied to that of the Russian people. II This view disposes the O[[hodox
community co be more patiem with the Russian people and theit state than
religious groups that see themselves as a prophetic minority.
The cominuing hold of an establishmemarian, amisectarian memality
helps co explain some of the episodes of accommodation co the state in the
Soviet period beginning with Metropolitan Sergii's declaration of loyalty in
1927. Fathet Joh n Meyendorff has wri[[en abom this comroversial event:
The goal of Metropolitan Sergii was

TO

preserve not himself, but the church. with

all its liturgical order, buildings and central administrative organs. He consciously
refused co limit his thinking to "the salvation of the minority. not the majority," as
was done by Bishop Damaskin and others who went "underground." In his view
the Church-wirh its essential apostolic succession in the episcopate and its (some
times burdensome) heritage of divine services, theology and canons-could not
exist for long as a secr. The historical example of the Russian Old Believers had
confirmed this. 12

Such an imerpretation of the chutch's accommodation co the state is more
satisfying than one focusing on political terrOr, moral cowardice, or the infJ
rration of the hierarchy by state agents, for it takes the Orthodox value system
imo accoum. Metropolitan Sergli was speaking about Orthodoxy, not other
churches, when he asserted that "only impractical dreamers can rhink that
such an immense community as our Orthodox Church, with all its organiza
tions, may peacefully exist in this country while hiding itself from the gov
ernment." 13 One may question the wisdom ofMerropolitan Sergii's policy on
tactical grounds, for it brought the church no real gains. Bur one can scarcely
fault the Orthodox Church for trying co remain itself.
At the same time, the ideal of a national church can make a positive con
tribution co the consciousness of rights in a country co rhe extent that it fos
ters a sense of legitimacy on the part of the religious community. The sense
of legitimacy is typically long-lasting. To pUt it another way. if rhe negative
side of Orthodox patience is passiviry in the face of oppression, the posirive
side is endurance. Despite decades of Communist propaganda and repres
sion, countless Russians petsist in the conviCtion thar the Onhodox Church
has a righ rful place in their land and a self-evident claim co itS alienated
monuments. These people may not express theit view in legalistic terms.
Moreover, the tights at stake are not generalizable: we might call them "his
roric rights" rather than "human rights." Nevertheless, the view that
Orthodoxy has rights in the Russian land is a key facrot in the behavior of
the Orthodox Church in present-day Russia and was also an important, if

I

ambiguous, resource for the Soviet huma!
discussion of hiscoric rights later.

SOVIET

LAw ON

RELIGION
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SOV1ET

LAw ON

RELIGION

On October I, 1990, rhe Supreme Soviet of the Congress of People's Depuries
of rhe USSR adopred a new law on religion, rhe Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations. Larer in the same momh rhe
Supreme Sovier of the Russian republic (RSFSR) passed a comparable piece
of legislarion, rhe Law on Freedom of Religion. 14 These fWO laws complerely
ovenumed previous Sovier legislarion on religion. To understand the situation
of Russian Onhodoxy and human rights in the Soviet period, however, one
must examine rhe earlier legislation.
Soviet law on religion embodied fWO cardinal principles. First, only indi
vidual believers had rights; churches and religious associarions did nor.
Second, the right of believers to pracrice their religion was limited to the area
of ritual.
These principles srood out clearly in the first piece of Soviet legislation on
religion, the decree of the Sovier of People's Commissars on Separation of the
Church from the State and the Schools from rhe Church of January X9t8.15
The decree revoked all civil restricrions connected with religious affdiarion
and mandated thar "in all official documents every memion of a citizen's reli
gious affiliation or nonaffiliarion shall be removed." It granted cirizens rhe
right to "confess any religion or profess none at all," "free performance of reli
gious rires ... as long as it does nor dismrb public order or infringe upon the
rights of citizens of the Soviet Republic," and the right "ro receive and give
religious insuuction privarely."
Religious associations, however, were denied vinually all righ tS, not just the
privileges connected with religious establishment such as adminisrration of
oaths, sanctification of public ceremonies, and registrarion of marriages and
births. The decree barred religious associations from holding properry, orga
nizing schools, and going to law. It stated categorically that ecclesiasrical and
religious associations "do not have the rights of a legal entiry."
The only concession concerned access ro property designed for rimal use:
"Buildings and objecrs inrended especially for religious rites shall be handed
over, by special decision of rhe local or cenrral governmental authorities, free
of charge for use to responsible religious associations." Since this provision
appeared in rhe arricle narionalizing the properry of religious associations
(Article 13) it clearly meanr ro distinguish use from ownership. Moreover, as
the article leEr rhe gran ring of use of STare property ro rhe "special decision" of
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the state authorities, it could scarcely be interpreted [Q imply a firm right ro
such use. Finally, the use of stare properry by believers was granted specifically
for the performance of rituals. Social service, missionary work, political
action, religious publishing, and orher rypes of religious activiry outside the
rirual sphere were nor menrioned at all.
It is inreresring to note that rhe decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars
made no mention of atheism. The righr ro profess no religion covers the case
of atheism but extends also to agnosticism, free-thinking, and deism.
Furthermore, the decree did not accord special privileges to nonbelievers or
systems of nonbelief. Yet atheism played an integral role in the formation and
evolution of the Soviet Union as an ideological state, and eventually it fouod
a privileged place in Soviet fundamental Jaw. The constitution of 1977, con
tinuing in rhe rradition of its predecessor (1936), granted a kind of establish
menr to arheism in so far as it accorded the leading role in Soviet sociery ro
"the Communist Parry atmed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine" (Article 6).16 It
also gtanted an advantage to atheists in the marter of propagating their faith:
"Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to citizens of the USSR, that is, the
right to confess any teligion or to confess none at all, ro perform religious cults
or ro conduct atheistic propaganda" {Article 52).17 In othet words, atheists had
a constitutional right to spread their wotd; believers did not.
The most detailed piece of legislation on religion in the Soviet period was
the Law on Religious Associations of 1929.18 The law introduced the distinc
tive mechanism for the regulation of teligion in the Sovier Union, the dvadt
satka, or "group of !Wenry." The decree of January 1918 provided that build
ings and cult objects could be handed over for use ro "tesponsible religious
associations." The problem for the state was how to implement this policy
without appeating to extend tecognition or privileges to actual ecclesiasrical
instirutions, such as conciliar bodies, the patriarch, bishops, assemblies of
clergy or patish councils. The Law on Religious Associations came up with a
solution: the authotities at the ciry or district level would lend state property
(Q groups of nor fewer than !Wenry believets who accepted formal registration
as a religious association and responsibiliry for the property temporarily
entrusted to them. The dvadtsatka was an ad hoc group, nor a corporate body.
The rights oflegal entiry and the right of assembly without the permission of
the local authoriries were denied ro it. Needless to say, the dvadtsatka did nor
correspond to the canonical inStitutions ofany chutch. Strictly speaking, with
the introduction of the dvadtsatka the Russian Orthodox parish as well as all
ecclesiastical institutions beyond rhe parish level ceased to exist as entities
enjoying recognition or protection under public law.
As long as state policy aimed at the destruction of the church me Law on
Religious Associations corresponded ro realiry and assisted the implementa-
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tion of policy. The change of direction during the war years, however, pro
duced a conrradictoty siwation. The Russian Orrhodox Church, permirred
and even encouraged ro reconsriwte itself, naturally followed its tradirional
canons. On rhe local level rhis meanr rhe reconsriwrion of the patish wim a
cletical rector ar its head. The regulations on parish life adopred by the Local
(i.e., Narional) Council of the Russian Orrhodox Church in January 1945
acknowledged the dvadtsatka bur stipulared that the clerical rector should
head ir. 19 The "religious association" of1929 became a "parish society," rho ugh
not wirh the sanction of Soviet law.
.
The comradiction lasred umil rhe Khrushchev persecution, which undid
the teligious setrlement of the war years. In July 1961 a council of bishops of
me Russian Orrhodox Church approved me elimination of me clergy from
chairmanship and membership of parish councils, effecrively removing mem
from parish governmenr. 20 The bishops claimed to be remedying abuses as
well as relieving priests ofburdensome secular duties ro allow them more time
for pasroral work. In fact rhe hierarchs were bowing (0 state pressure ro resrore
a strict interptetarion of the dvadtsatka of 1929. The All-Russian Council of
1971, me first national council of the church held after 1945, did not abrogate
the arrangements of 1961, nor did the anlendmems [0 me Law on Religious
Associations in 1975 change it in any fundamental way.2! Nor until the
Gorbachev reforms of the mid-198os was there a him in any official source
that Soviet law on religion needed [0 be changed.

THE ORTHODOX RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The Orthodox rights movemem was part of the Soviet human rights move
ment and developed along parallel lines. 22 The Soviet human rights move
ment dates ftom the Constitlltion Day demonsuation in Moscow's Pushkin
Square on Decembet 15, 1965, by intelligentsia protesting the arrest of rhe
writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. The key demand was a public trial
for me accused. The protesters believed that publicity would expose me gap
between the letter of Soviet law and its adminiStration by the authorities.
"Respect the Soviet Constiwtion!" was the slogan of the day.23
On the same day me Orrhodox rights movement surfaced in an open let
ter ro N. V Podgorny, chairman of the Ptesidium of the Supteme Soviet of me
USSR, written by the Moscow priests Gleb Yakunin and Nikolai Eshliman.
The priests ptesented a detailed btief alleging violations of Soviet law on reli
gion by me state authorities. Two days earlier the ptiests had sem a lerret ro
Patriarch Aleksii I atguing meir case in theological terms. They sem copies of
both lerrets to the entire Russian Ormodox hierarchy.24 While there had been
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other protests by Orthodox clergy and lairy in 1965 regarding rhe state of
affairs produced by the Khrushchev persecution, the witness of Yakunin and
Eshliman was especially important because of its connection with the wider
Soviet human rights movement.
The number of clergy and lairy involved in the Orthodox rights movement
was small. It was a movement of heroic individuals, as was the Soviet human
rights movement generally. As for the hierarchs, they made a practice of dis
ciplining activist clergy and keeping their distance from dissident laity.25
Yakunin and Eshliman, for example, were removed from their parishes and
banned from exercising priestly office (although nor defrocked) following the
open letters of 1965.
There were numerous links between rhe Orthodox acrivists and the wider
human righrs movement. The first human rights organization in the Soviet
Union, the Initiative Group for rhe Defense of Human Rights in rhe USSR,
formed in 1969, counted the Orthodox lay hisrorian Anaroly Levitin-Krasnov
among irs founders. The Committee for Human Righrs in rhe USSR, formed
in 1970 by Valery Chalidze and others, rook a lively interest in religious rightS
cases. 26 Orthodox publicists contributed frequently ro the samizdat literature
in which the Soviet dissident intelligentsia conducted irs debares. 27 The grear
esr publicisr of the period, the Orthodox layman Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,
publicly embraced rhe Orthodox rights movement in his "Lenten Letter" to
Patriarch Pi men in 1972. The leuer appeared in rhe Wesrern press shortly after
Solzhenirsyn's first major interview wirh Western reporters in many years in
March 1972.28 The interview marked the beginning of the explosive period of
Solzhenitsyn's acrivism, culminating in the publication of The Gulag
Archipelago in December 1973 and his expulsion from the Sovier Union rhe
following February.
The Moscow Helsinki Warch Group, which announced its program in
May 1976, found its Orthodox counterparr in the Chrisrian Committee for
the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers in the USSR, although
Orthodox Christians were also to be found in the leadership of rhe Helsinki
Group. The Christian Committee, founded in December 1976 by Father
Gleb Yakunin and orhers, was a watch group specializing in religious cases. 29
Irs interdenominarional concern wirh the rights of all believers, not jusr
Orthodox, reflected the extent to which rhe Orthodox rights movement had
been shaped by the general human righrs movement. The Chrisrian
Committee also followed rhe lead of the Helsinki Group in promoting the
internarionalization of the struggle for human rights on rhe basis of the
Helsinki accords of 1975. In October of that year Father Yakunin and the lay
church hisrorian Lev Regelson addressed an open letter to rhe delegates of
the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches meeting in Nairobi
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in which they pUt forward the idea of an interchurch effort to defend reli
gious rights, in essence the idea that the Christian Committee was formed
to serve a year la ter.30
During the repressions of the late 1970S and early 1980s the Orthodox
rights movement suffered the same fate as the general human rights move
ment. The attack on the leadership of the Helsinki Group began with the
arrest of many of its founding members in February and March 1977, includ
ing Yury Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky and the Orthodox layman Aleksandr
Ginzburg. The repression of the Christian Committee began on the eve of the
invasion of AfghaniStan and the exile of Andrei Sakharov from Moscow
(December 1979-January 1980). Father Gleb Yakunin was arrested in
November 1979, and most of the other leaders were detained in the following
months. In 1980 Yakunin was sentenced to five years in prison followed by five
years of internal exile.
The association of the Orthodox rights aCtivists with the general human
rights movemeut was not JUSt ptagmatic but extended to values and method
ology. The distinguishing characteristic of the Soviet human rights movement
in contrast to orher dissident tendencies (especially nationalism) was its para
mount concern with law and the cultivation of respect for law in Soviet soci
ety. In the words of Pave! Lirvinov the movement represented
nor only a rebirol of goodness and merc)', bur rhe birrh of a sense of law in Sovier
sociery. For rhe firsr rime rhe inrelligenrsia recognized rhar the Soviet constiTUrion,
in spire of all irs imperfections, is a fundamental law which in irs lener prorecrs rheir
digniry as cirizens, on paper defends human righrs. The hnman rights movement
discovered a powerful lever of social rransformacion, namely law, when ir turned Ole
anen rion of the Sovier bureaucrac)' as well as of sociery and Ole resr of rhe world [Q
rhe lack of conformiry beTWeen Ole conducr of rhe regime and the constirution and
Sovier legislarion, and also ro [he many inrernarional convenrions and rrearies on
human rights which rhe Soviet Union has rarified nor so much wirh a view [Q cheir
execution as ro its own international repurarion.)l
The same attention to law was typical of the Orthodox rights movement.
Yakunin and Eshliman's letter to Podgorny is a good example, indeed one of
the earliest examples of the new legal consciousness cited by Lirvinov. The let
ter protested the policies of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs
of rhe Council of Ministers of the USSR, the state agency responsible for
supervision of the Orthodox Church. 32 The priests charged that the council's
policies violated both the principles and the particulars of Soviet law on reli
gion. In the introduction to the letter, for example, the priests faulted the
council fot conducting most of its business otaUy. "The very method of using
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unofficial oral decrees, which the leaders and representarives of the Soviet for
Russian Orthodox Church Affairs chose as a means of sysremaric interference
in the internal life of the Orthodox Church, is a violation of the principles of
the Law. "33 In rhe body of the letrer the authors discussed eight cypes of vio
lations of Soviet law on religion: registration of clergy as a means of interfer
ing with their placement, mass closing of churches and monasteries and ille
galliquidarion of religious societies, registration of baprisms and Other sacra
mental acts, restriction of ritual practices, violation of rhe principle of freedom
of conscience with respecr to children, interference in the financial life of
church communiries, limiration of the number of members of a religious soci
ety to the group of twency, and limitations on the sraffing of clerical positions.
The argumentation in all of rhese cases was deliberately legalis ric. The
priesrs rook rheir stand on rhe decree on Separarion of the Church from the
State and the Schools from the Church, the Law on Religious Associarions,
and other relevant legislarion. In many particulars rheir arguments were quite
compelling. Ir was difficult ro deny, for example, that the registration of bap
tisms by local governmenral authorities amounted to official documentarion
of religious affiliation, specifically excluded by rhe dectee on Separation of the
Church from the Stare and rhe Schools from the Church. The priests also
made a good case when they argued that the cusromary limitarion of the
responsible membership of religious associarions to twency individuals was
nor warranted by rhe Law on Religious Associarions, which required only that
associarions be composed of "not fewer" than twenty citizens. The authors
exposed anorher unwarranted inference when they argued that legal liquid a
tion of a prayer house by local authorities should not automatically signify the
dissolution of the teligious association that occupied it.
From the beginning the Soviet human rights movement wrestled with the
tension between respect for Soviet law and the need to change it. In the area of
religious rights this tension was especially severe because of the paucicy of rights
accorded to religion in the first place. In theit letter to Podgorny, Yakunin and
Eshliman held firmly to the theme of respecting and enfotcing existing Soviet
law. As the tights movement gained momemum, however, its critique became
more radical. The internationalization of the snuggle for rights after the
Helsinki accords of 1975 also tended to sharpen criticism of Soviet realicy. In
1977, when a nationwide discussion of rhe draft of rhe new consriturion was
taking place, the Christian Committee ventured ro raise the issue of the pref
erential rreatment of atheism in the constiturion in a letter to Brezhnev. 34
To be sure, there was no comradicrion between pteaching respecr for law
and attempting to change it at the same time. The new legal consciousness
embraced both causes. Almost no one in the Sovier human rights movemem
advocated working for change by violent, exrralegal means.
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The Orthodox righrs acrivists represented a challenge to rhe church as well
as ro the state. They did not quesrion the legirimacy of the Patriarchal church,
as some Russian Onhodox splinter groups did. They did not even question
the policy of peaceful accommodation with rhe Soviet srare. They did ques
tion the church's acquiescence in policies rhat rurned accommodation into a
one-sided relationship of dependence prejudicial to the integrity of rhe
church, and they challenged the Patriarch and the bishops ro playa more
aggressive role in conteSting such policies.
Again, Farhers Yakunin and Eshliman srated the case besr. Their lerter to
Patriarch Aleksii I in 1965, incorporaring the legal case made in rhe lerter to
Podgorny, lent theological and ecclesiastical perspective to their cririque. In
spitir rhe letter was prophetic rather than legalisric. The priests cried out
against practices in the eanhly, everyday church which contradicted the tran
scendent realiry of the church.
The letter consisted of three parts. In the firsr the aurhors pointed our that
a theological as well as a legal principle was at srake in the violation of religious
rights. Citing rhe words of Jesus, "Render untO Caesar the things that are
Caesar's, and unto God rhe things that are God's" (Matk 12:17), the priests
atgued that these words "put an end to rhe claims of a pagan state to toral
dominion over man," which is why "for the firsr time in history Chtisrian
dOCtrine proclaimed the infinite value of human personaliry."35 In the second
part of the leerer the authors discussed a matter not raised in the letter to
Podgorny: the prerogatives of the parish priest. With copious citarions from
Orthodox ca.non law the authots argued tbar rhe decision of the council of
bishops in 1961 to remove priesrs from the parish councils produced a fla
grantly uncanonical state of affairs at rhe local level of Orthodox church life
and offended the digniry of rhe priestly office. An epigraph ro this section of
the letrer put it poignantly: "the hireling is not a shepherd" Uohn lO:n). In
rhe Ia..~t pan of the letter rbe authors reviewed rhe glories and tribulations of
the Orthodox Church in Russian history and concluded wirh an appeal ro the
parriarch to lead the church our of its bondage to secular authoriry, if neces
sary at rhe price of his own securiry. "The patriarch is appointed to be like
John rhe Forerunner, the friend of rhe Bridegroom, who lays down his life for
the puriry of rhe bride."36 More particularly they called on Aleksii to summon
a widely representative national council of the Russian Orthodox Church
which would meer to restore the canonical norms of church life.
Patriarch Aleksii I did not rake up rhe challenge addressed to him by the
dissident priests. The next narional council took place after his death, in 1971,
and met for the purpose of electing his successor. It did not undo the arrange
menrs of 1961. The new patriarch, Pimen, soon faced a similar challenge,
however. In his "Lenten Lener" of 1972, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn cited the
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examples of Yakunin and Eshliman seven years earlier and implored Pimen to
rake rhe iniriarive in rhe suuggle ro free rhe church from bondage even ar the
price of personal martyrdom. "Do nor ler us suppose, do nor make us rhink
that for the archpasrors of the Russian Church earthly power is higher rhan
heavenly power, earthly responsibility more fearsome than responsibility
before God."37
Nor all Orrhodox rights activists approved of rhe cacric of challenging rhe
patriarch and bishops ro confront the srare aurhorities ar any price. One of the
responses elicired by Solzhenitsyn's "Lenten Letter" provided evidence of
divided opinion. Ir came from the pen of Father Sergei Zheludkov, a priest in
rhe ciry of Pskov with a long record of involvement in rhe struggle for
Orthodox rights and close ries ro the dissidem intelligentsia. He rook excep
tion ro Solzhenirsyn's all-or-nothing approach, arguing rhar it would lead ro
martyrdom and an underground church. He held that the legal church "can
nor be an island of freedom in our strictly and homogeneousLy organized soci
ety run from a single Center." He approved of rhe hierarchy's policy "some
how [0 sign intO the system and for the time being [0 make use of the oppor
tunities permined by ir. "38 Bur in spite of disagreements over rhe hierarchy's
aCtual or porential role in the srruggle for righrs, mosr Orthodox dissidents
agre,ed rhat the patriarchal church was rhe Russian Orthodox Church on
whose behalf rhey were fighring. This consensus in itself resrified ro a consid
erable degree of good will [Oward the church on rhe parr of the acrivisrs. Their
rolerance demonstrared Christian parience and love. It also refleCted a recog
nition that rhe real anragonisr of the human rights movement was not the
Orthodox Church bur the Soviet stare.

1980-1988: THE MILLENNIUM ARRIVES
In many ways rhe outlook for human rights in the Sovier Union seemed
bleaker in 1980 rhan it did in 1965. The repressions of the late 1970S closed
down the Soviet human rights movemem and confirmed the doubrs of many
concerning rhe prospecrs for changing rhe Sovier sysrem by legal means.
Orthodox activists experienced these doubrs as acutely as rheir secular col
leagues. Legalism seemed to have led ro a dead end. The way was open for
reconceiving rhe struggle for Orthodox righrs along mote radical lines, such
as an underground ch urch or an alliance wirh righr-wing Russian narionalism.
Yakunin, as ever rhe leading Otthodox dissident, announced his break with
the legalisr approach in a report on "The Present Siruarion of rhe Russian
Orthodox Church and the Prospecrs of a Religious Renewal in Russia," dared
Augusr 15. 1979. 39 In ir he advocared the crearion of a "caracomb church"
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through secret (though canonical) ordinations of bishops and priests. The
underground clergy would minister (0 the far-flung masses of Russian
Onhodox Christians whose needs were nor being met by the severely
resrricred Moscow Parriarchate. If the Patriarchate refused to collaborate in
setting up such a nelWork, as it almost surely would, Yakunin advocated cum
ing to a sister Orthodox church, such as me Orthodox Church in Ametica,
fOt assistance. 40 The practicality of such an approach was debarable. In the
context of me human rights struggle, however, me impOrtant poim was that
Yakunin had lOSt confidence in his own movement.
Yakunin's pessimism roward the Moscow Patriarchare was unrelieved. He
wenr so far as to assert mat "if the freedom to conduct religious propaganda
were suddenly granted in our counrry, the members of the Moscow
Patriarchate would be incapable of profiting from this opportunity.,,41
Ironically, rhe one servant of the patriarchal church on whom Yakunin passed
favorable judgment, Famer Dmitry Dudko, scandalized the dissident com
munity a few monms later with a nationally tdevised recantation of his role
in the human rights struggle of rhe 1970s.42 It seemed as if history were play
ing tricks on Yakunin.
And so it was, though more benignly than he or his colleagues could have
imagined in the dark days of 1979-80. For even as me dissidents walked me
via dolorosa of prison, exile, or capitulation, changes were in the making in
church-state relations and in the Soviet state itself which by the mid-1980s
produced a more favorable environment for human rights in the Soviet lands
rhan at any time since the Bolshevik revolution. On the one hand, an accel
eration of the Orthodox Church's vindication of its historic rights in the
Russian land enhanced the visibility of the church in Soviet society. Second,
the accession to power of a group of reform Communists led by Mikhail
Gorbachev in 1985 opened me way to a rapid advancemem of human rights
in all spheres of Sovier life.
The improvemem of me church's historic rights began before Gorbachev's
accession to power. In the late 1970S and early 1980s the Parriarchate's long
term srrategy of loyalty to the state began to payoff more palpably than
before, at least for the cenrral church institutions. The number of theological
srudents doubled between 1971 and 1981.43 The Publishing Department of me
Parriarchate increased its Staffand managed ro get a new building consrructed
in central Moscow ro accommodate work on an expanded range of projects. 44
A large construction project was authorized in 1983 with rhe return of the
buildings and grounds of the Danilov Monastety to the church. The Danilov,
named for St. Daniil, a medieval grand prince of Moscow, was rhe city's old
est monastery. The reStoration of the facility broughr an Orthodox monastic
ptesence to the capital for the first time in decades as well as providing a highly
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visible residence for the pauiarch and a sear for the Holy Synod and some
other units of the Patriarchare.
The church in the provinces did nm benefIt to the same extent as the cen
tral institUtions, ahhough there were some improvemenrs. There was a mod
est increase in the building and reopening of churches in some pans of the
counrry starting in the late 1970s.45 At about the same time deanery and
diocesan conventions of clergy, indispensable to the rebuilding of the
Orthodox Church on the provincial level, began to be held again after a lapse
of almost three decades. 46
The gains fOt the Orthodox Church in me early 1980s, while small com
pared w the expansion at the end of the decade, were exceptional in [WO
respects. First, they exceeded earlier gains by an appreciable margin. Second,
they occurred during a time of unprecedented lassitude and decline in the
Soviet Union as whole. Indeed, the Orthodox Church was about the only
instirution in the counrry w show any vigor in the late 1970S and early 1980s.
To explain this phenomenon one should probably reckon with a number of
facwrs ranging from the hand of Providence ro the machinations of atheist
bureaucrats. The timing of the concessions to the church, for example, makes
it tempting to suspect that they were inrended as a reward ro plianr hieratchs
at a time when harsh punishment was being meted Out to Orrhodox rights
activists. But the gwwth in the church's strength could also be seen as an
example of the countercyclical capaciry of religion to show vitality when sec
ular power structutes fall inro decline.
In any case, the Orthodox hierarchy won real gains, not just cosmetic
improvemenrs, during the petiod. The bishops showed particular skill in their
manipulation of a date of great symbolic importance in Russian history: 1988,
the miJ lennial anniversary of the baptism of the people of Kiev under Prince
Vladimir in 988. In the struggle for historic rights, historic occasions playa
key role. By declaring their inrenrion to celebrate the millennium in a gtand
way the Orthodox hierarchy was able to wage a more or less open campaign
to enhance the visibility of the church in Soviet sociery. In this effort the
church probably benefIted not a little from the suPPOrt it enjoyed among
some of the more nationalistic members of the Soviet establishmenr.
Bll[ the decisive change that allowed the Moscow Spring of 1988 to happen
occurred nm in the church but in the ruling elite of the Soviet state. Coming
to power in 1985, MikhaiJ Gorbachev and his associates promptly set about
implementing an ambitious reform agenda: first gLasnost', Ot freedom of
expression; then perestroika, or the restructuring of social, politicaJ, and eco
nomic institutions. In terms of rights issues the most promising aspeCt of the
reform effort was the idea of "a state based on law" (pravovoe gOJll.darstvo) and
the caHs for upgrading the legal profession, making legal services more avail-
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That the immediate source of these ideas was the "legalist" thinking of the
Soviet human righrs movemem was toO plain to be missed. The movemem
had won its case, albeit posthumously.
In the spring of 1988, virtually on the eve of the church millennium, the
reform process took a great leap forward when Gorbachev's government
declared itS intention to create a new national parliament, the Congress of
People's Deputies. Elections to this body were held in March 1989; it met for
the first time in June. Similar parliamems were later created on the republican
level. A substantial body of human rights legislation, including the 1990 laws
on freedom of religion mentioned above, was one of the most notable accom
plishments of the new parliamemary insritutions.
Before 1988 the Communist reformers made no public sratements on reli
gion. Their silence lefr the teligiously otiemed public in a state of uncertainty
about the reform process. In May 1987 a group of nine prominent Orthodox
clergy and laymen ried to the Orthodox righrs movement tried to bring the
mattet to a head in open letters to Chairman Gorbachev and Patriarch
Pimen. 48 They called on Gorbachev to exrend glasnost and perestroika ro the
religious sphere by granting believers the right to publish scriptures and reli
gious literatute, to be heard in the mass media, to participate in rhe prepara
tion oflegislation affecting religious life, to engage in philanthropy and social
service-in short, to participate openly and equally in Soviet society. In effect
the nine called for a consistem policy: "We wish to believe in the reality of the
restructuring that lies ahead. But the process of democratization going on in
our country is essemially indivisible. The Russian Orthodox Church cannot
be left out of it."
To the patriarch the nine declared that they did not expect the tenewal of
freedom to be any easier to achieve in the church than in Soviet society at
large: "Immobilized, mme and timid for so many years, [rhe church] has to
learn allover again how to walk and talk." The group imploted rhe patriarch
"nor to let slip the unique histOrical opportunity which the Lord is sending
our Homeland and our MOther Church."
Despite the lack of official sratements, however, a gteat libetalization of the
conditions of religious life was already underway by mid-I987. Religious dis
sidents, including Father Yakunin, were released from exile or deten rion.
Yakunin's sacerdOtal functions were restored by the Patriarchate, and he was
assigned to a parish in the Moscow area. 49 A program to upgrade Jewish insti
tutions was openly discussed by official spokesmen. 5o Adult baptisands and
parems preseming children for baptism, ar least in Moscow, were no longer
asked to show their domesric passpOrt before receiving the sacramem, i.e., the
rite was no longer subjecr to civil registrarion. 51 As we have noted, this prac
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tice was long singled Out by critics as an affront to religious conscience and a
flagrant violation of Soviet law. Another sign of improvement was the series of
three international scholatly conferences on Russian Orthodox history and
tradition commemorating the millennium of the baptism of Russia. 52 The
conferences marked the first time that the ch urch was allowed to sponsor
international meetings on a subject other than ecumenism or world peace.
The second and third conferences in the series featured participation by dis
tinguished Soviet scholars from secular institutions as well as clergy and the
ologians. The open collaboration between secular and ecclesiastical scholars
was another "first" for the postwar period.
As for rhe legal statUs of religion, there was evidence that new legislation
was being prepared at the highest levels. In the January 1986 issue of the
JournaL a/the Moscow Patriarchate thete appeared a mysterious last page enti·
cled "Our Legal Advice: The RightS and Obligations of Religious Societies."53
In actualiry the page did not relay "advice" from any ecclesiastical source but
ptesented eight dtaft paragraphs of a secular law code employing the termi
nology, but departing from the substance, of the Law on Religious Associa
tions of 1929. The draft explicitly recognized religious associations as legal
entities with the right to make COntractS and act as plaintiff or defendant in a
court of law. It granted religious associations the right to purchase (nor merely
take on loan) and hold tirle to various kinds of property including titual
objects, means of transport. and buildings. The right of religious organiza
tions to employ temporary or permanent staff on cOntract was also recog
nized. In short, the "Advice" subverted the entire tradition of Soviet legisla
tion on religion. Since such a publication could not have appeared at the time
withour official approval, it encouraged hopes for a breakthrough to religious
liberry in the USSR. The unanswered question was whether the principles of
"Our Legal Advice" would be written into state law; and if so, when?
The intentions of the Communist reformers with respect to religion were
publicly clarified in April 1988 when Chairman Gorbachev held an unptece
dented and highly publicized roundtable meeting with the senior hierarchs of
the Russian Onhodox Church. 54 The rone and substance of his remarks were
conciliatOry even though he felt obliged to declare that Lenin's 1918 Dectee on
the Separation of the Chutch from the State and the School from the Church
was a measure that "opened the way for the church to pursue its activities
without any son of outside intetference." He conceded that "mistakes" were
made with respect to the church and religious believers in the t930S and there
after, observed that the errors were being corrected, wished the church well
on the eve of its millennium and invited the Orthodox communiry to col
laborate in the wotk of perestroika on the grounds that "we have a common
history, one Fatherl and and one future." The laSt point was especially
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poignant in that it was a major ideological retreat for a Communist leader to
envision religion as having any SOrt of future, never mind the same as his own.
Most imponandy, GOtbachev announced that "at the present time a new law
on fteedom of conscience is being devised in which the interests of teligious
organizations as well as othets will be reflected." The long-rumoted prospect
was now official.
When the church observed its millennium in June 1988, then, it did so in
a spirit of confidence and independence. The main event was a national
church council composed of the hierarchy and elected clerical and lay repte
sentatives, The gathering was only the third national council of the Russian
Orthodox Church in the Soviet period (the others were in 1945 and 1971). It
was the firSt to be held for a putpose other than electing a successor to a
deceased patriarch.
In the area of rights the most important action of the council was the adop
tion of a fundamental statute for the Russian Orthodox Church. 55 Based
firmly on Orthodox canon law and the abrogated precedent of 1945, the new
statute formally ended the bondage of the church to the pattern dictated by
the Law on Religious Associations of 1929 and the humiliating pseudo-coun
cil of 1961. It went much further than the statute of 1945 in spelling out struc
tures of authority and decision-making in the church. A tiered set of institu
tions at the diocesan, episcopal, and national level was set up to exetcise the
church's newly won sovereignty over its affairs. At the time of its adoption, of
course, the statute contradicted existing Soviet laws on religion despite a nOte
W the contrary placed at the head of the document. The discrepancy may
explain why the church delayed formal publication of the statute. 56
Nevertheless, the text circulated freely and its provisions began w be imple
mented immediately following the council.
Thus the millennium passed amidSt a great liberation. Seventy years after
the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian Orthodox Church emerged from its
Babylonian exile ro claim "a future and a hope" Oeremiah 29:10).

RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE 1988

The anrlUs mirabilis of 1988 marked the end of the long struggle for civil rights
and the beginning of a new period in the history of the Russian Orthodox
Church. The new era is without precedent. Never before, not even in pros
perous periods of its life under the tsars, did the Russian Church enjoy the
freedom of action that it possesses today. What the church will do with its
freedom-how it will respond to the challenges of a complex modern civi
lization, how it will deal with the religious pluralism of POst-soviet society,
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what positions it will take with tegard ro the state, rhe schools, ptivate prop
erry, and the whole tange of modern rights issues-all of these are open ques
tions. The answers will come, some soon, Others more slowly, as the Russian
Orrhodox communiry brings its rich tradition of piery and rheology to bear
on them. One safe prediction is that rhe new situation will Stimulate a gteat
deal of fresh theological reflection.
In terms of Russian Orthodoxy and human rights the period since 1988 has
been shaped by thtee developments: rhe rebuilding of church institutions, rhe
codification of legal tights, and the emetgence of rights issues quite different
from those which occupied the church in rhe Soviet period.
The rebuilding of the Russian Orthodox Chutch has proceeded with
remarkable rapidiry and on a larger scale than even the friends of the church
expected. In rhe period 1985-1987 the church opened or reopened a tmal of 29
parishes, a tespectable numbet by prereform srandards. In 1988, however, 809
new parishes were registered; in the first nine months of the following year,
2,185. In roughly the same period a half dozen new theological schools and a
dozen new monasteries wete opened.57 The repossession of historic monu
ments large and small-from the Kiev Caves Monastery to street corner
chapels and rural pilgrimage sites-also proceeded rapidly in all areas of
Orthodox settlement. The boom continued in the 1990S. By late 1993 the
number of new and reopened parishes in the Moscow Patriarchate surpassed
7,000, bringing the total number of patriarchal parishes w more than 14,000.
In other words, the Patriarchate doubled in size in a five-year period. In the
same period the number of monasteries rose from about 20 to more rhan 200;
the number of theological schools, from four to 38.58 The numbet of historic
Orthodox monumenrs rescored during the period is incalculable.
The scale of the Orthodox renewal in Russia and the othet countries of rhe
Moscow Paniarchate would appear w make it the largest revival of hiswric
Ch tistianity in the twentieth centuty. At the very leaSt the rebuilding of
Orthodoxy has dramatically alteted the Russian landscape. Russia is begin
ning ro look like an Otthodox counrey again.
To be sure, one would have to examine the spititual dimensions of the
Orthodox revival in ordet co evaluate it ade qua rely. But rhe material facts
alone prove at leaSt a couple of things. They prove that rhe Orthodox Church's
claim to possess historic rights in the Russian land enjoys a good measure of
popular support. Second, they show rhat the Moscow Patriarchate, whatever
its failings, possesses greater reserves of energy and imagination than its
Soviet-era detracwrs allowed. When Father Yakunin wrote in 1979 that "if rhe
freedom to conduct teligious propaganda were suddenly granted in out coun
try, the members of the Moscow Patriatchate would be incapable of profiting
from this opportuniry,"59 he scatcely imagined rhat the hout would come
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when his proposition could be verified. Bur the hour came, and the proposi
tion turned oUt ro be wrong.
The codification of the civil rights of the Russian Orthodox Church and
othet teligious associations in the Soviet lands was achieved with the adoption
of laws on religious freedom by the legislatures of the USSR and the RSFSR
in October 1990.60 The All-Union law ceased to apply after the dissolution of
the USSR at the end of 1991. The 1990 RSFSR law remains in effect in the
post-soviet Russian Federation.
The All-Union (USSR) law cattied the principles of "Our Legal Advice"
(1986) to their logical conclusion. It recognized religious otganizations as legal
entities (Article 13) and their tight ro acquire and hold various kinds of prop
erty (Articles 17-20). Ir recognized as "religious organizations" not JUSt local
congregations bUt "directorates and central institutions, monasteries, religious
brotherhoods, missionary societies (missions), religious schools and also asso
ciations of religious organizations" (Article 7). Ir confirmed the right of reli
gious organizations ro eStablish ties with groups outside the territory of the
USSR, the right of believers to leave the country for pilgrimages and other
religious purposes (Articles 9, 22, 24), the right of parents and guardians to
taise children in a religion (Article 3), and the right of all Soviet citizens to PUt
sue religious education "in the language of their choice, individually or
together with others" (Article 6). Ir recognized the right of religious organiza
tions to conduct religious services and other ritUals in houses ofworship, reli
gious centers, private homes, cemeteries and crematoria without conditions.
Services in hospitals, prisons, and homes for the elderly and invalids were
admitted "at the request of citizens" inhabiting the inStitUtions, with religious
otganizations having the right to solicit such requests (Article 21).
The law granted religious organizations the right to solicit voluntary con
ttibUtions of money and other property, exempting such contributions from
taxation (Article 18). The right of religious organizations to fOtm business
enterprises (e.g., publishing, testoration, agricultural concerns) and social ser
vice institutions such as hospitals and shelters was also recognized. Profits
ftom such enterprises wete declated taxable (Article 19) unless applied ro chat
itable or educational ends (Anicle 23). Discriminatoty tax rates on clerical
income were eliminated (Article 26).
The RSFSR law recognized all the aforementioned tights and rhen some,
allowing considerably wider latitude ro religious expression than the A11
Union law. The law explicicly recognized the religious libetty of foreign citi
zens on Russian soil (Article 4). It authorized the Russian government "upon
the requesr of mass religious organizations ... to make decisions regarding the
declaration of great religious holidays as additional nonworking holidays"
(Article 14). Ir recognized the right of registered religious organizations ro
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offer instruction in schools and O[her educational instirurions "on an optional
basis." & for the milirary, the All-Union law provided only rhar "the com
mand of military units will nO[ prevem military personnel from taking part in
religious services or performing religious rituals during their free time"
(Article 21). The RSFSR law pur the maner in more posirive terms, speaking
of ''rhe right to conducr and participate in religious rites in military units of
all branches of service" and charging militaty administrations actively to assist
citizens with arrangements for religious observance (Article 22). The RSFSR
law also provided for conscientious objection to the bearing of arms by means
of an alternative service option (Article 7).
Another area in which rhe All-Union and RSFSR laws differed was that
concerning the moniroring of religious organizations. Under the All-Union
law, registration with the stare authoriries was required of all religious organi
zarions seeking recognition as legal enrities. 10 supervise the process the law
provided for "a state organ on religious affairs" to be formed by rhe Council
of Minisrers of the USSR (Article 29), i.e., a body much like the Soviet-era
Council for Religious Affairs. The responsibilities of the "organ" included liai
son with analogous bodies on rhe republican level, information gathering on
religious activities and on implementarion of rhe laws on religion, offering
expert advice ro organs of administration and rhe courrs, assisting religious
organizations in negotiations with state aurhorities and promOting under
standing and toletance between religious confessions in the coumry and
abroad. Such a broad mandate clearly envisioned the conrinuation of an
active, even interventionisr, role for rhe state in religious affairs.
The RSFSR law broke with the Sovier tradition of monitoring religion
when ir declared that "executive or administrative organs of srate authority
and state job posirions specially intended to resolve issues telated ro the
exercise of citizens' rightS to freedom of religion may not be instirured on
the rerritory of the RSFSR" (Article 8). Implementation of the law on reli
gion was assigned to the Ministry ofJustice and local law enforcement agen
cies. The Council for Religious Affairs was duly abolished in the RSFSR on
January 1,1991. On the other hand, the RSFSR law preserved the same reg
istration requirement as rhe All-Union law. It also followed the All-Union
law in providing for an "expert" council of"represematives of religious orga
nizations, social organizations, state organs, religious experts, legal experts,
and other specialisrs in the sphere of freedom of conscience and religion" to
conduct research and give advice on issues involving religious organizations
under the auspices of the Comminee on Freedom of Conscience, Religion,
Charity, and Philanrhropy of the Russian parliament. While a council of
experts is a far cry from the Council for Religious Affairs with its plenipo
tentiaries, the RSFSR law still envisions a degree of collaboration between
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governmental and teligious authorities which a more precise law might have
sought to avoid.
In the past, of course, State intervention in the religious sphere was
prompted mainly by ideological considerations. The aim was to promote
atheism and discourage religious belief The new laws placed atheism on an
equal footing with otber atticudes toward religion. Soviet citizens wete always
free to confess any religion or none at all, but only atheists enjoyed the right
to propagate their views. The new laws granted all citizens the right to prop
agate their views and barred the state from financing either atbeist propaganda
or religious activities. In terms of the constitutional history of the USSR the
disestablishment of atheism was perhaps the most significanr achievement of
the new legislation. A year before its demise the USSR became a secular state.
With the adoption of the 1990 laws on religion most of the issues which
exercised the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet human rights move
ment during the long years of captiviry passed into history. Implemenration
of the new rights will take time, and there will be complications along the way.
But the old issues are unlikely to recum to center stage. New issues are already
taking their place.
One of these came into view even before the 1990 laws on religious liberty
were finalized: the role to be played by the Orthodox Church in the legislative
process itself. During the Soviet period, of course, there was no role for the
church w play in the legislative arena. But in a democratic Russia, where the
legislative process is presumably responsive to civil sociery, the question of the
church's role, and that of Other teligious forces, naturally arises.
The Russian Orthodox episcopate was deep~y involved in official discus
sions of the draft of the All-Union law of 1990. The bishops wen t so far as w
publish critical commenraries on the draft before and aftet its adoption, win
ning a number of changes to their liking and failing to get their way on oth
ers. 61 For example, they urged deletion of a sentence in the section on separa
tion of church and state providing that "the activities of state organs, organi
zations and employees may not be accompanied by divine liturgies, religious
rituals and ceremonies."62 The provision was in fact deleted, which opened
the way for blessings, prayers, and othet overtly religious actions to be per
formed on state occasions. So, for example, when Boris Yeltsin was inaugu
rated as the firSt democratically elected presidenr of Russia in July 1991, the
patriarch of Moscow rook part in the ceremony, blessing the new officeholder
and making a speech exhOrting the presidenr and people of Russia "to take lip
each other's burdens, and thus ... fulfIll the law of Jesus."63 In the negative
column, the bishops proposed wording guaranreeing that religious instruc
tion could be given "in the [public] schools on a voluntary extra-curricular
basis." Pattiatch Aleksii, a membet of the Soviet parliament at the time, vig
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orously supporred rhe amendment; bur ir was rejecred by a vote of 303 to 46.64
The All-Union law did nor explicitly bar religious instruction from the
schools, however; and, as we have nored, rhe RSFSR law was hospitable to it.
In fact many Russian schools currently accommodate religious instruction,
usually conducted by clergy or itineram missionaties. The decision [Q allow or
disallow rests with local school administrations.
Another deficiency in the All-Union law from the bishops' poim of view
was its treatmem of Orthodox parish communities as legal emities distinct
from the church as a corporare body. As the bishops saw it, the legal entity of
parishes should derive from that of the church as a whole because "in the
[Orthodox] Church there cannot be 'religious communities' which ate inde
pendent from the hierarchical cemer and from each other."65 The practical
issue was the degree of latitude to be enjoyed by local Orthodox churches in
relation to the central church administration. The Moscow Patriarchate faced
vigorous challenges from competing Orthodox jurisdictions in the late
Gorbachev and early pOst-soviet years and feared secessionist movemems in
its ranks (with good reason). The bishops wan ted to ensure that any Orthodox
parish that abandoned the Moscow Patriarchate would lose its property and
rights of legal entity.
The theoretical issue was the degree to which the "self-understanding of
the Church," as the bishops called it, should be taken into account by secular
lawmakers. Secular law aims to treat all religions equally, bur this is easier said
than done. A law that tegards local teligious communities as autOnomous
entities, for example, has a diffetent meaning for chutches with congrega
tionalist polities (e.g., Baptist chutches) than fot a church with an episcopal
sacramental polity.
The prominence of the Orthodox hierarchy in the legislative debates of
1990 pointed to an even latger issue: the role to be played by the Orthodox
Church in the POst-soviet Russian state. Religious minotities as well as athe
ists and secularists worry that the chutch is bent on securing a ptivileged posi
tion fot itself in the new Russia. The sheer size of the Orthodox Church and
its thousand-year tradition ofstate establishment are certainly grounds for the
minotities' fears. So is the display, episodic bur ftequent, of the symbols and
clerical petsonnel of Orthodoxy on all SOrtS of official occasions. So ate the
innumetable cases of ditect church-state collaboration, including pooling of
funds, which can be documented throughour Russia tOday.
One may cite the reconsftuction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in
central Moscow as a case in point. This church, once the largesr in Moscow,
was built in the nineteenth century ro commemorate Russia's victory over
Napoleon. In 1931 it was dynamired by the CommuniSt city government. In
January 1995 the parriarch and the mayor of Moscow laid the cornerstone of a
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replacemene suucture, which is being built wirh heavy reliance on state funds.
Naturally the finished product will nor be a hiscoricaJ monumenc or milirary
shrine or Baptisr or Advenrist prayer house, but an Ormodox church. 66
Privileged rreatrnenr of me Orehodox Church was evidene on the occasion
of irs official regisuation as a legal encicy in the RSFSR in the spring of 1991.
The formal act of regisrration had ro be postponed because of Pattiarch Aleksii
II's pilgrimage co the Holy Land and Other scheduling complications.
Meanwhile, other religious organiz.ations including Jehovah's Witnesses,
Mormons, Baptisrs, Sevench-Day Advencists, and Buddhists were officially
registered by the republican authorities. Nevereheless, when the pauiarch
returned home and wenr co register his church, the official documenr he
received from rhe hands of me Minister of]ustice bore a regisuation number
rich in symbolism: the number 1. 67
In shore, rhe blurring of distincrions between church and state is pervasive
in presenr-day Russia and will remain so uncil clarified by more precise laws.
Clearer legislation, in turn, depends on rhe clarificarion of attitlldes in
Russian civil sociecy as a whole, including the Onhodox Church. In orher
words, me issue of church-state relations will remain a lively one in Russia for
a long rime co come.
Foreign expens can playa useful role by bringing rhe experience of orher
counuies co rhe attencion of Russian legislacors, church leaders and legal
scholats; but in the end rhe issues of religion and policy facing Russia must be
serded in a way mar makes sense co rhe Russians memselves. Every legal [fa
dition represenes a synchesis of universal notions of rights wirh concrete his
torical conditions and commitmenrs. The tendency of European and
American criries of Russia has been co concenrrate on rhe universal and ignore
rhe particular. But in Russia as elsewhere the parricular demands irs due.
In rhe presenc case tespecr for me parricular means making a sympathetic
penetrarion of rhe modern hiscory of rhe Russian church and resisring docui
naire approaches. Because me memalicy of Russian Orthodoxy is deeply col
ored by a long tradition of religious esrablishmenc, and because rhe idea of
religious establishmem is viewed wirh suspicion by mosr modern human
righrs theorisrs, rhe application of human righrs rheory co me case of Russian
Orthodoxy can quickly degenerare inco polemies and simplisric dichocomies.
But if the job of rhinking abour human righrs is in rhe first instance not to
change the world but to undersrand ir, the case of Russian Orehodoxy (and
orhet Orehodox churches) is a rich subjecr for the invesrigaco[.
The study of religious establishmenr-panicularly de facto sociocultural
esrablishmenr, which is a vasrer phenomenon rhan the juridical variecy-is
one of rhe mosr neglecred subjecrs in the com para rive study of religion. The
special parhos of the Russian church in the twemierh century is also scanrly
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appreciated. The Russian Orthodox Church was not disestablished by a
constitutional process but by a cruel and arbitrary powet determined to
eradicate the church altogether. Far from living "at ease in Zion," the lead
ers of the church trod the parh of persecution and martyrdom. 68 Thar rhe
blood of rhe martyrs is the seed of the church is a rruism of church history.
What is not so widely recognized is that the principle applies JUSt as much
ro priestly church establishments as ro prophetic minorities. The aura of
sanctity abour the patriarchal church was enhanced, not diminished, by
Communist persecution.
The mentality of establishmenr is not confined to church circles. The
Russian srate is as inrerested in promoring close church-srate relarions as the
episcopate, and wirh good reason. Present-day Russia is nor a peaceful, pros
perous, or productive country. Devasrated by decades of oppression, Russian
civil society must be rebuilt from the ground up. In these circumstances no
Russian government, particularly not a democtatic one, can afrord to draw a
cordon sanitaire betWeen itself and the largest and hest organized institurion of
Russian civil society.69
Interreligious, intercommunal, and internarional relations are orher arena..~
in which complex rights issues are emerging for Russian Orthodoxy. Mosr of
the faith communiries of pOst-soviet Eutasia are experiencing genuine reli
gious liberty for the firsr time, and thete is confusion abour whar ir means.
There is a real danger that rhe free marker in religion will spawn violent eth
nic and religious conflicrs. In Ukraine, for example, no fewer rhan three sep
arate Eastern church jurisdicrions-Ukrainian Orthodox (Moscow Patri
archare), Ukrainian Autocephalous, and Ukrainian Catholic-vie for a share
of the rich ecclesiasrical patrimony of rhe region. Compecing Orrhodox juris
dictions also distutb the peace of the church in rhe Russian Federation.
The growrh of nontraditional Chrisrian seers and exotic non-Christian or
pseudo-Christian cults in Russia represents an even more baflling challenge to
Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox community has long been used to dealing
with Muslim Tarars, Buddhisr Mongols, and orher peoples of the Russian
Federarion whose religious orientation is a matter of historic rradition. It has
a harder rime coming to terms wirh Russians who embtace nontradirional
religious options. Orthodox sensiriviries in this regard have been greatly exac
erbared by the ridal wave of foreign missionaries that has washed over Russia
since 1988. The church views most of the newcomers as interlopers whose
vocation is to rustle rhe Russian people away from its true shephetds. The
irony is that the foreign missionaries operate under the wartant of the 1990
law on religious liberty which the Orthodox Church helped set in place.
Refusal to accept this irony for what it is led the senior hierarchy of rhe
Russian Orrhodox Church to launch what can be termed its mosr controver-
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sial initiative of the 1990S relative to human rights: agitation to amend the
1990 legislarion on religion in such a way as to bar or otherwise limir the reli
gious aCtivities of foreigners on the territory of the Russian Federarion. An
amended Jaw was in faCt adopted by the Russian parliamem in rhe summer of
1993, only ro be veroed by President Yelrsin. A revised version of the amend
mem also turned our to be a dead lener following Yelrsin's forcible dispersal of
the parliament in the birrer conflicr of September-Ocrober 1993. Still. rhe
issue has not been laid to resc Another revision of the 1990 law has been under
discussion in the Duma since 1994. Ar hearings on the mattet in early 1995 the
Patriarchate let it be known that it still favors limitations on the religious
activities of foteigners in Russia.7°
The Patriarchare's campaign drew a good deal of international anention
and prompted the intervention of Western-based human rights activists.
International conferences on the issue were held in 1994 and 1995 at which the
proposed limitations on religious acriviry in Russia were roundly criticized as
violating the international human rights norms stated in the Universal
Declaration. the Helsinki Final Act, rhe Vienna Concluding Document
(1989), and other instruments ro which Russia is a parry.7 t There is no reason
ro suppose that the monitoring of religious conditions in Russia and other
post-Communist stares will cease any rime soon. Western missionary and
human rights groups are well otganized, well financed, and well connected
polirically. Russian church leaders will not be able [0 ignote them. Even less
will a democratically oriented Russian government find it easy to counte
nance violations of rreaties to which it is a signarory. In effect, the environ
menr in which the Russian Orrhodox Church carries out its ministry has
been imernationalized.
The outlook for relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and
Wesrern religious and rights organizations should not be painted [00 darkly.
Strong internationalisr currems have long existed in the chutch. especially
among rhe hierarchy. An interesting featute of the Russian bishops' commen
tary on the All-Union law of 1990, for example. was theit commendation of
international human rights insrruments. The bishops hailed the AlI- Union
law as the first piece of Soviet legislation rhat "answers [0 rhe fundamental
principles of the Universal Declararion of Human Rights, the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the other agreements
reached by participating governmenrs in the course of implementing the
Helsinki process. "72
Even more important as a stimulus to inrernarionalism is the composition
of rhe parriarchal church irself. Always more cosmopoliran than irs repurarion.
the Moscow Patriarchate became a truly inrernational community of churches
following the breakup of the USSR in 1991. Preeminent not just in Russia, the
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patriarchal church is the largest church in Ukraine and Belarus, one of the
largesr in rhe Baltic countties, and a significam presence on the religious scene
in all fifteen pOst-soviet states. The church also has close, if no longer juridi
cal, ties ro a daughter-church in North America, the Onhodox Church in
America. The leadership of rhe Patriarchate is deeply committed ro holding
this diverse community of churches rogether ro the extent possible in the face
of ethnic, political, and ecclesiastical pressures to rhe contrary. Many chutch
men surely recognize rhar the interests of rhe Pattiarchare and its huge flock
in rhe Near Abroad and elsewhere will be bener protected in rhe long run
through reliance on international human rights norms than by religious pro
tecrionism, ad hoc political pressures, or other artificial arrangements.
Crirics of me Moscow Patriarchare view irs effortS to preserve irs organiza
tion in rhe Near Abroad as a dangerous manifestation of neo-sovier "empire~
saving. "73 The accusarion should not be dismissed lightly, since rhe alienation
ofsome twenty-five million Russians from rhe Russian state is certainly a polir
ical earrhquake rhar will send aftershocks rhrough rhe region for years to come.
But it is equally important to recognize thar rhere is an ecclesiastical principle
ar stake in rhe ambitions of rhe Moscow Patriarchate. Sectarianism, splinter
ing and the proliferarion ofjurisdictions are not rhe final word in church polity
from an Orthodox point of view. Nor is there any theological reason for the
church to mirror the polirical divisions of the age. It may be a good thing for
post-soviet Eurasia ro divide into erhnically based democratic republics. But
rhe Russian church is nor a republican entity any more rhan ir was a tsarist or
Sovier enrity. Its citizenship is in heaven. Like the cross of Christ in which ir
glories, rhe Orrhodox Church srands "rowering o'er the wrecks of time."
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